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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEARL H. STEFFENSEN,
Plaintiff/Petitioner/CrossRespondent ,

Case No. 910560

vs.
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,

Priority No. 14

Defendant/Respondent/CrossPetitioner.

BRIEF OF PETITIONER

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(a) (1992) which grants the Utah Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction to review "a judgment of the Court
of Appeals."

Mrs. Steffensen's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

was granted on May 12, 1992.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Plaintiff/Petitioner Pearl H. Steffensen presents the
following questions for review:
I.

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously apply a harmless

error analysis after it determined that the trial court committed
1

error by directing a verdict in favor of Defendant/Respondent
Smith•s Management Corporation ("Smith's")?
A.

Is a harmless error analysis appropriate when the

appellate court holds that the directed verdict was erroneously
granted by the trial court?
B.

Even if a harmless error analysis is appropriate

in such circumstances, is such an analysis appropriate in this
case?
II.

Did the Court of Appeals erroneously classify

foreseeability and, in essence, overrule a Utah Supreme Court
case in holding that Jury Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but
that the error was harmless?
III. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously affirm the
exclusion of evidence in contravention of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and Utah Supreme Court cases?
In reviewing decisions of the Court of Appeals, this Court
accords the lower court's statement of law, statutory
interpretation, or legal conclusion no particular deference. The
decision is reviewed for correctness.
P.2d 464, 465 (Utah 1991);

State v. Humphrey, 823

City of Monticello v. Christensen,

788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any constitutional provisions, statutes or rules pertinent
to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text of
this brief.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Petitioner, Pearl H. Steffensen, an eighty-two
year old woman, was seriously injured while shopping at a Smith's
store located at 2100 South and 900 East in Salt Lake City, Utah
when a shoplifter, being pursued through the store by Smith's
employees, collided with her, knocking her to the floor.

(R.

1242 at 5-6). 1
Mrs. Steffensen commenced this action against Smith's
alleging that Smith's negligence was the cause of her injuries.
Among other things, Mrs. Steffensen alleged that Smith's failed
to properly train its employees to deal with shoplifters; that
Smith's employees violated Smith's written policies before
apprehending Mr. Burnett by failing to deter him; and that
Smith's employees violated Smith's written policies by chasing
and attempting to stop Mr. Burnett after he ran from them.
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 485 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

After presentation of all the evidence, Smith's

counsel moved for a partial directed verdict on the grounds that
Smith's failure to adequately train its employees and to deter
Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not be the proximate cause of
All references are to the record page number.
All
transcripts and depositions are stamped with a record page number
on the opening page. Because of confusion in the denomination of
the transcripts (i.e. there are at least three transcripts labeled
"Vol. IV"), transcript citations are given as "R.
at
" where
the first number is the record page number of the transcript and
the second number is the page number within the transcript volume
e.g., R. 1243 at 50 denotes page 50 of the transcript volume
labeled as record page 1243.
3

Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1216 at 2-6).
granted Smith's motion.

(R. 1216 at 7).

The trial judge

The jury found that

Smith's had acted negligently but that the negligence was not the
proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.

(R. 1198)

(Addendum A ) .
Mrs. Steffensen appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming:
(1) that the trial court improperly granted the partial directed
verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No.
32 which required the jury to find that Smith's employees must be
able to specifically predict Mr. Burnett's actions in order to
find that Smith's actions caused Mrs. Steffensen's injuries, and
(3) that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony
regarding Smith's training practices and the apportionment of
fault between Smith's and Mr. Burnett.

The Court of Appeals

issued an opinion affirming the trial court on October 29, 1991.
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (Addendum B).

The Court of Appeals held that the

trial court committed error in granting the partial directed
verdict.

820 P.2d at 489.

However, the Court of Appeals then

applied a harmless error analysis and held that the trial court's
error was harmless. 820 P.2d at 490.

The Court of Appeals also

held that Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but that the error was
harmless.

820 P.2d at 490.

Finally, the Court of Appeals held

the exclusion of expert testimony on employee training was
harmless error and that the exclusion of testimony on the
4

apportionment of fault was proper.

820 P.2d at 491.

This Court

granted Mrs. Steffensen's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on
May 12, 1992.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
Mrs. Pearl H. Steffensen, an eighty-two year old woman,
routinely shopped at the Smith's store at 2100 South and 900 East
in Salt Lake City. (R. 1242 at 5-6).

Each week she usually

cashed a check for herself and another for her husband at the
store's customer service counter. (R. 1242 at 7).

On March 2,

1987, Mrs. Steffensen was in line at the customer service counter
when the incident which resulted in her injuries occurred. (R.
1242 at 9-14).
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered the store
intending to shoplift beer and cigarettes. (R. 1243 at 6).

Gary

Canham, the store's front-end manager, observed Burnett shortly
after Burnett took beer and cigarettes from the store's shelves
(R. 1243 at 56). Canham suspected that Burnett might attempt to
leave the store without paying for the items. (R. 1243 at 6061).

Canham informed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King manager, of

the situation and the two watched Burnett. (R. 1243 at 60).
Rather than deter Burnett through the use of eye contact or a
greeting as mandated by Smith's written policies, Rompus instead
played "cat and mouse" with Burnett by watching him while
pretending to work. (R. 1244 at 131).
As he walked toward the front of the store, Burnett believed
5

the managers were watching him and was deterred. (R. 1243 at 89).

Burnett, therefore, stood in a check-out line for a few

minutes. (R. 1243 at 8-9). When Burnett thought that he was no
longer being watched, he left the line and walked quickly toward
the exit with the beer and cigarettes. (R. 1243 at 11).
The two managers pursued Burnett and, after stopping him,
asked him to accompany them to the store's office. (R. 1243 at
12-13).

As the three walked to the office, Rompus, in Burnett1s

presence, called to another employee at the front of the store
and told her to call the police. (R. 1244 at 137). As the group
reached the office, Burnett dropped the beer and cigarettes,
pushed Canham to the ground, and bolted toward the exit.

Rather

than allow Burnett to escape as Smith's own written policies
required, Rompus grabbed Burnett's shirt and pants and was
dragged on the ground for a few steps before releasing Burnett.
(R. 1244 at 140). Rompus then yelled, "stop him - see if you can
stop him" in an effort to get others to stop the now-fleeing
Burnett. (R. 1244 at 140, 181).
In response to Rompus1 call to action, Randall Achziger, a
store bagger for Smith's, assumed a semi-crouched position he
learned from playing football and attempted to stop Burnett. (R.
1244 at 188). Burnett collided with Achziger. (R. 1244 at 196).
Burnett bounced off of Achziger and into Mrs. Steffensen,
knocking her to the ground. (R. 1244 at 196). Achziger, who had
been knocked to the floor by the force of the collision, and
6

other Smith's employees then recaptured Burnett.
The force of the collision knocked the elderly Mrs.
Steffensen to the hard tile floor. (R. 1242 at 14). Her head
violently struck the floor and she sustained severe injuries
resulting in stroke-like symptoms which paralyzed the entire left
side of her body. (R. 1242 at 19-25).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mrs. Steffensen first contends that the Court of Appeals
correctly determined that the trial court had erroneously granted
Smith's motion for a partial directed verdict but that the Court
of Appeals then erroneously applied a harmless error analysis.
The Court of Appeals' application of a harmless error analysis
resulted in that court holding that the erroneously directed
verdict constituted harmless error.

Mrs. Steffensen asserts that

the application of such an analysis is unprecedented and
incompatible with the standard of review for a directed verdict.
Furthermore, even if a harmless error analysis is permissible in
such cases, the court's conclusion that the error in this case
was harmless is erroneous.
Mrs. Steffensen next contends that the Court of Appeals
misapplied the law on the issue of foreseeability.

The court

held that an instruction on the issue of foreseeability given by
the trial court was erroneous but harmless.

However, in reaching

this conclusion, the court sub silentio overruled Rees v.
Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978).
7

A correct analysis

indicates that the error was not harmless.
Finally, Mrs. Steffensen asserts that the Court of Appeals
misinterpreted Rule 704 of the Rules of Evidence in upholding the
exclusion of expert testimony concerning the adequacy of Smith's
training procedures and the apportionment of fault.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A HARMLESS
ERROR ANALYSIS AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED SMITHS MOTION FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT.
When the Court of Appeals applied a harmless error analysis
after determining that the trial court erroneously granted the
motion for a partial directed verdict, it decided an important
question of state law not previously considered by this Court and
it decided a question of state law in a way that conflicts with
dozens of cases decided by this Court over a period of decades.
In applying the harmless error standard, the Court of Appeals
committed error.
At trial Mrs. Steffensen had asserted two theories of
negligence against Smith's.

First, Mrs. Steffensen had contended

that Smith's had been negligent by failing to train its employees
to use techniques which would deter shoplifters and,
alternatively, that Smith's employees failed to employ such
techniques, prescribed by Smith's written policy manuals, to

8

deter Burnett.2

Second, Mrs. Steffensen asserted that Smith's

was negligent in its actions following Burnett's escape.
At the close of evidence, Smith's moved for a partial
directed verdict, arguing that even if its employees had not been
adequately trained in deterrence techniques and had failed to use
such techniques in this case, the failure was not the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1216 at 2-6).

The trial

court granted Smith's motion and instructed the jury that Smith's
conduct before the detention of Burnett could not be considered:
You have heard testimony regarding events
that occurred prior to the time of the stop
of the shoplifter, Mr. Burnett. You are
instructed that none of the actions of the
Smith's employees prior to the stop and
detention proximately caused plaintiff's
injuries.

Smith's employee manuals advocated the use of techniques
designed to deter shoplifters. For example the manuals stated:
Make sure that employees on the sales floor
are greeting and making eye contact with
customers, especially those who are acting
suspiciously.
Make use of the intercom system by calling for
security from time to time. Very effective
tool, it gives the potential shoplifter an
uneasy feeling that security is in the store.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Addendum C)
3
In an extended footnote the Court of Appeals explained
that while the trial judge had both granted a directed verdict and
incorporated the ruling into the jury instructions, the trial
judge's ruling was most "accurately characterized as a partial
directed verdict." 820 P.2d at 486, n. 1. No one has alleged that
the court's characterization is erroneous.
9

Therefore, you must not take this testimony
into consideration when deliberating and
making your decision.
(R. 948) .
On appeal Mrs. Steffensen asserted that the trial court
improperly granted a partial directed verdict.

After a lengthy

discussion of proximate cause the Court of Appeals held that the
trial court's ruling on the motion for partial directed verdict
was erroneous and declared:
There was probably sufficient evidence
produced from which a reasonable juror could
infer that Smith's failure to deter was a
negligent act, as it would have been
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately
trained employee that his or her decision to
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store
could have led to a customer's injury.
Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 489 (footnote omitted).

However, after

reaching this conclusion, the court applied a harmless error
analysis and held that the trial court's error had been harmless.
The court reasoned that "the jury must have concluded that
either: (1) the post-apprehension negligence was too attenuated
and remote from the injury to constitute the cause, or (2) Mr.
Burnett's attempt to flee was an unforeseeable superseding
proximate cause of the injury."

820 P.2d at 490.

The court

concluded that the jury could not "have reached a different
conclusion had it been allowed to consider acts Smith's
performed, or failed to perform, prior to apprehending Mr.
Burnett." 820 P.2d at 490.

Therefore, the court concluded the

error to be harmless.
10

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED A
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS TO A PARTIAL DIRECTED
VERDICT WHICH HAD BEEN ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED BY THE
TRIAL COURT.

When the Court of Appeals held that the trial court
erroneously granted a directed verdict, its subsequent
application of a harmless error analysis was inconsistent with
the required standard of review in such cases as previously
applied by this Court.

A directed verdict is only appropriate

when a trial court is able to conclude that reasonable minds
would not differ on the facts from the evidence presented.
Management Comm. v. Grevstone Pines, Inc.f 652 P. 2d 896, 897-98
(Utah 1982).

Furthermore, in making its determination the trial

court is required to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict is
sought.

Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980).

An

appellate court reviewing a directed verdict must apply the same
standard as the trial court.

Management Comm.f 652 P.2d at 898;

Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611
(Utah 1982).

Therefore, if the appellate court finds that there

was a reasonable basis in the evidence and the inferences drawn
therefrom that would allow reasonable minds to differ on the
facts determined from the evidence and that would support a
verdict in favor of the losing party, "the directed verdict
cannot be sustained.1' Management Comm. , 652 P.2d at 898.
A trial court is prohibited from considering the weight of
the evidence in passing on a motion for directed verdict,
11

Cerritos Trucking Co,, 645 P.2d at 613, and the standard of
review imposes the same limitation on the appellate court.

The

appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury.

By holding that the trial court erred in granting a

directed verdict, the appellate court has concluded that
reasonable minds could differ on the facts from the evidence
presented and that a verdict could have been entered for the
losing party.
In contrast, this Court has stated that harmless errors are
"errors which, although properly preserved below and presented on
appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome
of the proceedings."

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah

1989).4
When an appellate court holds that reasonable minds could
differ on the evidence and a verdict could have been entered for
the losing party, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, the
appellate court is stating that the error is not inconsequential
and that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error
affected the outcome."

Therefor, the basis necessary for an

appellate court to find error is simply incompatible with a

4

State v. Verde is the case cited by the Court of Appeals
to justify its harmless error analysis. However, Verde is not a
civil case and does not involve a directed verdict. In fact, the
quotation cited in the text and relied on by the Court of Appeals
was part of a longer discourse on the meaning of the term "manifest
injustice" under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c).
12

harmless error analysis.

Entertaining a harmless error analysis

in such a situation would be similar to considering a harmless
error analysis in the case of an erroneously granted summary
judgment; the required standard of review is inconsistent with a
finding of harmless error.

In both instances, once an appellate

court applies its required standard of review and finds error in
the direction of a verdict or the grant of summary judgment the
standard of review precludes application of a harmless error
analysis.
A review of 40 years of cases from the Utah Supreme Court
reveals that the Court has never held an erroneously granted
directed verdict to be harmless error.

Cases in which a

directed verdict has been erroneously granted are reversed and
remanded.

See e.g., Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,

801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989);

Whitaker v. Nichols, 699 P.2d 685

(Utah 1985); Acculoq, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984);
Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983);

Management Committee

v. Greystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982);

Little

America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982);
Seecrmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981).
One commentator has noted the inapplicability of the
harmless error standard to an erroneously granted directed
verdict:

The forty year period cited is an artificial limit
imposed by Petitioner's counsel and has no significance.
13

Whenever the appellant introduces sufficient
evidence to take his case to the jury, there
exists the possibility that the jury might
have found a verdict for him, had the error
not intervened. Hence, in such a situation
it would seem impossible for an appellate
court to determine definitely that the
verdict for the respondent was unaffected by
the erroneous matter. . . .
Only with such a standard as that set
out above or to phrase it differently,
disregarding the matter complained of, no
reasonable jury could have come to any other
verdict, can the appellate court validly
assert that it is not usurping the function
of the jury. For, unless the weight of the
evidence is so overwhelming, no conclusive
determination can be made as to the effect of
the error on the verdict. The determination
becomes rather that the verdict was not
incorrect in spite of the error. Appellate
courts that say this put themselves in the
jury box.
Note, The Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 450,
458-59 (1947).

See also J. Hoffman, Comparing the Standards for

Granting Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict:

Harville v. Goza, 33 Ala. L. Rev.

23, 27 (1981) ("[A trial judge] also knows that reversal of a
directed verdict will result in a new trial ... .")
In this case the novel action of the Court of Appeals
usurped the jury's function and effectively violated Mrs.
Steffensen's right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section
10 of the Utah Constitution.

The usurpation occurred despite the

court's statement that a reasonable juror could have found for
Mrs. Steffensen on the issue which the trial court took from the
14

jury.

In rationalizing the application of the harmless error

analysis, the Court of Appeals plainly substituted its judgment
for that of the jury.

In fact, the court conjectured that "the

jury must have concluded ... ." 820 P.2d at 490.

By doing so the

Court of Appeals "put [itself] in the jury box."

In noting the

dangers of such expedient solutions another court stated:
There is a temptation in a case such as
this, where the evidence weighs heavily in
one party's favor, to cut through the
restraints imposed by those fundamental
principles which protect the right of the
opposite party to have a jury pass on his
case. This is especially so if one is
impatient with the delays the jury process
entails. Although it may appear desirable in
a particular case to relax the time-honored
and hundred-of-times confirmed principles it
cannot be done without undermining them. It
is an old, legal truism that "hard cases make
bad law." For a reviewing court to relax the
long-settled standards of proof in a hard
case would encourage further relaxation; it
would be an invitation to trial judges to
weigh evidence and determine credibility.
Instead of the tried, sound, and clear-cut
standards that now prevail there would be
substituted indefinite and variable ones.
This inevitably would lead to more summarily
directed verdicts and to more appeals.
Mesich v. Austin, 70 111. App. 2d 334, 217 N.E. 2d 574, 578
(1966).

The Court of Appeals should not have applied a harmless
error analysis once it held that the trial court's direction of a
verdict was erroneous.

The Court of Appeals' application of such

an analysis was reversible error.

15

B.

EVEN IF A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IS APPROPRIATE
IN A CASE OF AN ERRONEOUSLY DIRECTED VERDICT, THE
ERROR IN THIS CASE WAS NOT HARMLESS.

In its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals stated
that Mrs. Steffensen introduced "substantial expert testimony"
that deterrence prevents shoplifting and thus "promote[s]
customer safety."

820 P.2d at 488.

Furthermore, the court noted

that "the experts testified that a retail store should also train
its employees to use care when apprehending a shoplifter."
P.2d at 488.

820

These factors led to the court's conclusion that

the trial court's ruling was incorrect and that there was
"probably sufficient evidence produced from which a reasonable
juror could infer that Smith's failure to deter was a negligent
act" and that "it would have been reasonably foreseeable to an
adequately trained employee" that the decision to chase a
shoplifter in a crowded store could lead to the injury of a
customer.

820 P.2d at 489.

(emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals justified the error as harmless because
the jury found that Smith's negligence was not the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries and the Court of Appeals
concluded that the jury would not have changed its verdict on
proximate cause.

820 P.2d 490. However, the Court of Appeals'

conclusion is erroneous.
The trial court, after granting Smith's motion for a partial
directed verdict, instructed the jury that Smith's conduct prior
to the stop of the shoplifter could not be considered.
16

This

instruction eliminated all evidence concerning the value of
deterrence in reducing shoplifting, all evidence concerning
specific deterrence of the shoplifter in this case, all evidence
concerning Smith's employees1 knowledge of the written store
policy to let fleeing shoplifters escape, and all evidence
concerning training of employees not to yell such things as "stop
him - see if you can stop him."

The jury could have concluded

from any or all of the excluded evidence that there was a
reasonable connection between Smith's acts or omissions and Mrs.
Steffensen's injuries.

See e.g., W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton

on Torts, § 41 at 266 (5th ed. 1984).
In each instance cited, Smith's conduct could reasonably be
seen as the cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.

For example, if

Smith's employees had continued the specific deterrence of Mr.
Burnett which forced him to stand in a check out line, he
ultimately would have been forced to either purchase the items or
leave them and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries would not have
occurred.

Similarly, if Smith's employees had adequate knowledge

to allow fleeing shoplifters to escape, as per written store
policy, Rompus would not have chased Burnett and yelled for other
employees to stop him and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries would not
have occurred.

If employees had been trained to allow fleeing

shoplifters to escape, the store employee who assumed the
football stance may not have done so and Mrs. Steffensen's
injuries would not have occurred.
17

Thus, in each instance of

evidence kept from the jury's consideration, the jury could have
found Smith's conduct to be the proximate cause of the injuries.
The Court of Appeals' conclusion to the contrary is an
unsupported invasion of the province of the jury and should be
reversed.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS SUB SILENTIO OVERRULED A UTAH
SUPREME COURT CASE IN ITS DECISION CONCERNING
INSTRUCTION NO. 32. GIVING THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT
HARMLESS ERROR.
Mrs. Steffensen claimed on appeal that the trial court
incorrectly instructed the jury on the issue of foreseeability.
The trial court gave the following instruction:
Foreseeability in these instructions
means injury or harm, if any, to a customer
which the defendant and its employees could
have reasonably anticipated as the natural
consequences of their actions, if any, even
though they were not able to anticipate the
particular injury which did occur.
In determining what is foreseeable you
must determine that the actions by Burnett
were predictable by Smith's employees and not
just a mere possibility.
(R. 944) . Mrs. Steffensen argued that the instruction,
Instruction No. 32, prevented the jury from finding that Smith's
negligence caused her injuries. (Brief of Appellant at 41, Case
No. 910210-CA).
The Court of Appeals agreed that the instruction at issue
was erroneous because it improperly focussed on the actions of
the specific shoplifter. 820 P.2d at 490. However, the court
18

applied a harmless error analysis and concluded that any error in
the instruction was harmless because "[t]he question of
foreseeability goes to the issue of negligence, and the jury
found Smith's negligent."

820 P.2d at 490.

By confining its

analysis only to the issue of negligence, the Court of Appeals
ignored case law from this Court and predetermined the outcome.
While the court was theoretically correct in stating that
foreseeability is related to negligence, the issue is not quite
so clear or simple.

For example, the Utah Supreme Court has

recognized a connection between foreseeability and both
negligence and proximate cause.

In Rees v. Albertson's. Inc.,

587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978), the Court stated:

"What is

necessary to meet the test of negligence and proximate cause is
that it be reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular
accident would occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an
occurrence of the same general nature."

(emphasis added)

In

its opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals effectively
overruled that portion of Rees and ignored the relationship of
foreseeability and proximate cause.
Support exists for the Rees position because foreseeability
may be relevant to both proximate cause and negligence.

See,

e.g., W. Keaton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts. § 43 at 298 (5th
ed. 1984) ("foreseeability in proximate cause means the same
thing as in negligence; . . . the same considerations that
determine the original culpability are to be used again to
19

determine liability for consequences."); 4 F. Harper, F. James &
0. Gray, The Law of Torts, § 20.5 at 163 (2d ed. 1986).
("Foreseeability does not mean the precise hazard or exact
consequences that were encountered should have been foreseen.
Upon this all are agreed whether they regard foreseeability as
relevant only to the duty issue, or to questions of proximate
cause as well.")

See generally Green, Foreseeability in

Negligence Law. 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401 (1961).

Even the

Restatement of Torts includes foreseeability in its proximate
cause sections.

See 4 F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, The Law of

Torts, § 20.5 at 168 (2d ed 1986) ("The formula chosen by the
Restatement in its section on proximate cause, with its emphasis
on what seems to be 'extraordinary' in the light of hindsight
seems to abandon the foreseeability test.

But careful analysis

shows that it does not.")
The quotation from Harper, James & Gray that
"[f]oreseeability does not mean the precise hazard or exact
consequences ... should have been foreseen" highlights the error
in Instruction No. 32. The instruction erroneously requires the
jury to find that Smith's could specifically predict Burnett's
behavior.

The instruction shifted the focus of the inquiry away

from the question of whether Smith's negligence was the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.
This Court faced a similar issue in Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed
Co.. 1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P.2d 1013 (Utah 1954).
20

In Glenn, the

defendant insisted that because a gravel slide was not the type
anticipated, "nor had such a slide occurred within the history of
the [defendant's] operations in this area, and because it is not
precisely demonstrable that defendant's operations caused the
slide, the defendant could not have foreseen the harm or the
manner in which it occurred and should not be held liable." 265
P.2d at 1015-16.

This Court held:

The fact that the defendant did not
foresee the likelihood of such an accident is
not controlling here, for it was warned that
there was danger to the men working under the
vertical bank. Negligence may be the
proximate cause of damage even though the
actor was not able to foresee the injury in
the precise form in which it occurred, nor to
anticipate the precise damage which would
result from his negligence.
265 P.2d at 1016.
In this case Smith's made an argument similar to that of the
defendant in Glenn which Instruction No. 32 erroneously
bolstered.

Smith's claimed that Burnett's attempted escape was

unforeseeable as were its consequences, Mrs. Steffensen's
paralyzing injuries.

However, just as in Glenn, the focus should

not have been on the precise form of situation or the damage
which might result but rather on whether Smith's was aware of a
general danger of the type encountered.

In fact, Smith's own

written policy manuals warned of such a danger:
However, our company policy is that no
employee is to take any action in the
apprehension of a shoplifter which will bring
harm to himself, to other employees or to
customers.
21

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Addendum D)
The most important thing to remember about
apprehending a shoplifter is that we do not
want anyone injured. There is nothing in the
store that is worth a person getting hurt
for. Use common sense, if the situation
can't be properly controlled let the
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license
number.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, Addendum C)
Clearly, Smith's was aware of the potential danger from
shoplifters.
The error in Instruction No. 32, which Smith's characterized
as "unfortunate" in its brief in the Court of Appeals, was not
harmless.

The instruction eviscerated Mrs. Steffensen's efforts

to connect Smith's negligence to her injuries. When this
instruction was coupled with the trial court's erroneously
directed verdict, the jury was constrained to find that Smith's
did not proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.

The

instruction and the directed verdict each deprived Mrs.
Steffensen of her right to have the jury decide her case.
POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED RULE 704 OF THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE AND IGNORED UTAH SUPREME COURT CASE
LAW IN UPHOLDING THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE.
Charles Sennewald, a qualified expert in the field of retail
store security, testified as an expert witness on behalf of Mrs.
Steffensen.

Mr. Sennewald testified regarding the standard of

care in the apprehension of shoplifters and organizational
22

structure of Smith's. (R. 1245 at 318-333)•

However, the trial

court excluded testimony from Mr. Sennewald regarding the
involvement of Smith's security administrators in the training of
employees in the handling and deterrence of shoplifters.

The

trial court excluded the evidence because it concluded that
Smith's failure to deter could not have been the proximate cause
of the injury and therefore, it concluded such evidence was
irrelevant. (R. 1245 at 335-42).

The trial court also excluded

evidence from Sennewald on the apportionment of fault between
Smith's and Burnett. (R. 1245 at 361).
The Court of Appeals held that, because of its resolution of
the proximate cause issue, the ruling on the exclusion of
evidence on training was harmless error.

820 P.2d at 491. The

Court of Appeals held that the trial court's exclusion of
evidence with respect to the apportionment of fault was correct
because such testimony would invade the province of the jury.
820 P.2d at 491.
Clearly, if this Court finds that a harmless error analysis
was inappropriate on the causation/directed verdict issue, then
the issue of the exclusion of expert testimony on training must
be reevaluated because the evidence was relevant to the causation
issue.

Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."
23

Utah R. Evidence 401. Mr.

Sennewald's testimony regarding Smith's improper training methods
was relevant because it would have demonstrated that laxity in
training and monitoring of shoplifting cases permeated Smith's
managerial hierarchy. (R. 1245 at 335-42).

Mr. Sennewald also

would have testified that if proper training and monitoring
procedures had been followed, the incident in this case would not
have occurred. (R. 1245 at 336). Knowledge of the origin of
Smith's inept and inadequate training program supports the
contention that Smith's negligence was the proximate cause of
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.
The trial court excluded evidence from Mr. Sennewald
regarding the apportionment of fault between Smith's and Burnett
because it concluded the evidence invaded the province of the
jury. (R. 1245 at 361-62).
trial court.

The Court of Appeals sustained the

820 P.2d at 491. However, the court reads Rule 704

of the Utah Rules of Evidence too narrowly.
Rule 704 states:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
In this case the Court of Appeals characterized Mr. Sennewald's
excluded testimony as a "legal conclusion" and cited a prior
Court of Appeals case, Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991), for the proposition that "legal conclusions" are
excludable.

However, in neither Davidson nor this case does the

Court of Appeals define "legal conclusion."
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In defining the parameters of the admissibility of legal
conclusions, one authority (who terms such conclusions
"inadequately explored legal criteria") warns of a pitfall:
Care should be taken in interpreting the
concept of "inadequately explored legal
criteria" and applying Rule 403 not to lose
sight of the fact that "the so-called
'ultimate issue' rule is specifically
abolished" by Rule 704 and that the standard
by which to judge opinions, lay and expert,
"is to admit them when helpful to the trier
of fact."
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, § 704.1 at 663 (3d ed.
1991) (footnotes omitted).

Even a cursory reading of the Court

of Appeals' opinions in this case and Davidson reveals that the
Court of Appeals continues to try to breathe life into the longdead ultimate issue rule and thus, applies the wrong standard to
such cases.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals dogged adherence to the
ultimate issue rule is contrary to the most recent pronouncement
of this Court.

In State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329 (Utah 1991),

issued before the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case, this
Court gave a very broad interpretation to Rule 704.

In Span, the

only evidence that a fire was a criminal act was the opinion
testimony of one of the fire investigators.

However, that

evidence was held to be sufficient to sustain a conviction.

819

P.2d at 332. The only limitation imposed on Rule 704 by the Span
Court was that the expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
25

819

P.2d at 332 n.l.

The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case is

simply inconsistent with Span.
Graham has defined when an opinion is helpful to the trier
of fact:
An opinion of a lay or expert witness is
helpful (1) when an expression of the
witness1 knowledge can be conveyed in no
other form, (2) where an accurate, total
impression was formed by a witness who is
unable to account for all the details upon
which it is based, or (3) most importantly
where an accounting of the details by itself
alone cannot accurately convey the total
impression held by the witness.
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence. § 704.1 at 663 (3d ed.
1991).

In this case an accounting of the details could not

accurately convey Mr. Sennewald's total impression of the case.
Therefore, the evidence would have been admissible had the
correct standard been applied.

Accordingly, the decision of the

Court of Appeals should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
In this case the trial court excluded relevant evidence of
proximate cause and then justified the erroneous direction of a
verdict and an erroneous jury instruction at least partially
because of the lack of evidence.

The Court of Appeals first

concluded that the trial court had erroneously directed a verdict
but then, in an unprecedented action, held the error harmless
based on the lack of evidence and the consequences of the
erroneous instruction.

Finally, the Court of Appeals

rationalized the erroneous exclusion of some evidence by
26

referring to its conclusion on the directed verdict issue.
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the
Court of Appeals should be reversed and the case remanded for a
new trial.

Respectfully submitted this

1

day of July, 1992.

oCCjio^C

Richkrd B. McKeown

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four (4) true and correct
copies of the above and forgoing to be mailed by United States
Mail, postage prepaid, this

I

day of July, 1992, to the

following:
Christopher A. Tolboe
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MAYBE
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Richard B. McKeown
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RlEDBtSTKfCTCfl'JBT
Third Judicfal District

OCT 3 1 1990

CRISTOPHER A. TOLBOE, No. 3678
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY
Counsel for Defendant
Smith's Management Corporation
124 South 600 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)53 3-8505

By.

.^...Nii. ^>*»ULT!
»«puty Cie/k

STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315
JOHN CLYDE HANSEN, No. 5286
MORGAN & HANSEN
Co-Counsel for Defendant
Smith's Management Corporation
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)5 31-7 888

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PEARL H. STEFFENSEN
AMMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION,

Civil No. C87-3662

Defendant,
On January

Judge Scott Daniels

22, 23,

above-entitled action
entitled

Court

and

24, 25,

came on
a

was represented
of

Parker,

Management

for trial

jury,

District Judge, presiding.

29, 30, and 31, 1990, the
before the above-

the Honorable Scott Daniels,

Plaintiff

Pearl

H. Steffensen

by Richard B. McKeown and Bradley H. Parker

McKeown

&

Corporation

McConkie,
was

and

represented

defendant

Smith's

by Christopher A.

Tolboe of Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey and Stephen
G. Morgan of

Morgan

&

Hansen.

After

both

parties had

rested, the

issues were

submitted to the jury on a special

verdict, which was answered as follows:
WE THE JURY, after having considered
all of the evidence presented to us at
trial and after having considered all of
the instructions given to us by the
Court,
hereby
answer
the following
questions, as follows:
QUESTION
NO.
1:
Was Smith's
Management Corporation negligent?
ANSWER:

Yes X

No

If you answer Question No. 1 "no,"
sign, date and return this verdict. If
you answer Question No. 1 "yes," then
answer Question No. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Was the negligence
of Smith's
Management
Corporation a
proximate cause of any injuries sustained
by Pearl Steffensen?
ANSWER:

Yes

No X

If you answer Question No. 2 "no,"
sign, date and return this verdict. If
you answer Question No. 2 "yes," then
answer Question No. 3.
Based upon the above answers to the special verdict,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that

plaintiff

dismissed on

the

defendant Smith's

take

merits,

nothing,
no

cause

that
of

the
action,

Management Corporation

of action from plaintiff Pearl H.

be

and that

recover its costs

Steffensen in

of $11,188.56.
DATED this ^

action

day of Fe&g-uajr.y« 1990.
BY THE COURT:
Scott Daniels
District Judge
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Pearl H. STEFFENSEN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
SMITH'S MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 91021O-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 29, 1991.
Customer brought action against store,
seeking damages for injuries sustained in
connection with store employees' attempts
to apprehend a shoplifter. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Scott Daniels, J., entered judgment for store, and
customer appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Billings, Associate P.J., held that: (1) erroneous jury instruction that store's negli-
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gent failure to deter shoplifter was not
proximate cause of customer's injuries was
harmless; (2) any error in instructing jury
on issue of foreseeability of acts of specific
shoplifter was harmless; (3) any error in
excluding evidence of store's failure to
train employees was harmless; and (4) expert testimony regarding relative fault of
tort-feasors was properly excluded.
Affirmed.

1. Trial e=*145
Trial court's ruling that store's failure
to deter shoplifter was not proximate cause
of injuries to customer that resulted when
store employees were chasing shoplifter
through store attempting to apprehend
him, was most accurately characterized as
partial directed verdict for purposes of review.
2. Trial <s=>142
Directed verdict is only appropriate
when trial court is able to conclude that
reasonable minds would not differ on facts
to be determined from evidence presented.
3. Appeal and Error <$=»927(7), 997(3)
Directed verdict cannot stand when,
reviewing evidence in light most favorable
to losing party, there is reasonable basis in
evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support judgment in losing party's favor.
4. Negligence ^=>1
A negligence claim requires plaintiff to
establish that defendant owed plaintiff a
duty, that defendant breached duty, that
breach of duty was proximate cause of
plaintiffs injury, and that there was in fact
injury.
5. Negligence <&=>56(1.7, 1.12), 61(1)
"Proximate cause" is efficient cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by efficient intervening cause,
necessarily sets in operation factors that
produce injury and without which result
would not have occurred; there can be
more than one proximate cause of injury so

long as each is contributing factor in causing injury.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

6. Negligence <3=»136(25)
Question of proximate cause is generally for jury.
7. Negligence <3=*136(25)
Proximate cause may only be determined by trial judge as matter of law if
there is no evidence to establish causal
connection, thus leaving causation to jury
speculation, or if reasonable persons could
not differ on inferences to be drawn from
evidence on proximate causation.
8. Negligence <&=>62(3)
More recent negligent act may break
chain of causation and relieve prior negligent actor from liability under proper circumstances, but if subsequent negligent
act is foreseeable to prior actor, both acts
are concurring causes and prior actor is not
absolved of liability.
9. Negligence <£»62(1)
A "superseding cause," sufficient to
become proximate cause of final result and
relieve defendant of liability for original
negligence, arises only when intervening
force was unforeseeable and may be described with the benefit of hindsight, as
extraordinary.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

10. Negligence <£=>62(3)
Fact that final act which produces injury is criminal conduct of third party does
not preclude finding that earlier negligent
act was proximate cause of injury if criminal conduct was, under the circumstances,
reasonably foreseeable.
11. Negligence <&=*62(1)
Negligent actor cannot rely on its own
subsequent acts of negligence to break
chain of causation between earlier act of
negligence and injury; only unforeseeable
acts of another constitute intervening proximate cause.
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12. Negligence <&»62(1)
Any negligence in store employees' apprehension of shoplifter and subsequent
chase through store, directly resulting in
customer's injuries, did not break chain of
proximate causation between customer's injuries and any earlier negligence of store
employees' in failing to deter shoplifter.
13. Negligence <s=>50
Store was under duty to take reasonable measures to protect customers from
injuries resulting from store's dealing with
shoplifters, where employee manuals advocated safe handling of shoplifters, thus
demonstrating that shoplifting was foreseeable in that particular store.
14. Appeal and Error <£»1032(1)
Appellant has burden of demonstrating
that error was prejudicial, that is, there
was reasonable likelihood that error affected outcome of proceedings. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 61.
15. Appeal and Error «=»1061.4
Any error by trial court in granting
partial directed verdict by instructing jury
that store's negligent failure to deter shoplifter was, as a matter of law, not proximate cause of customer's injuries, was
harmless since jury's verdict would not
have differed had trial court not granted
the partial directed verdict.
16. Appeal and Error <8=>842(1)
Court of Appeals reviews challenges to
jury instructions under correctness standard.
17. Appeal and Error <&=1068(1)
Any error in instructing jury regarding
acts of specific shoplifter, rather than shoplifters in general, on question of foreseeability that customer would have been injured as result of store employees' negligence in chasing shoplifter around the
store, was harmless since question of foreseeability went to issue of negligence and
jury found store negligent. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 61.
18. Appeal and Error e»1008.1(8), 1032(2)
Challenges to trial court's evidentiary
rulings, including exclusion of expert testi-

mony, are reviewed under deferential clear
error standard; appellant bears burden of
demonstrating that excluded evidence could
have influenced jury to render different
verdict.
19. Appeal and Error <®=>1056.4
Any error in trial court's exclusion of
evidence relating to failure of store to train
it employees regarding proper handling of
shoplifters was harmless where jury found
that employee negligence in apprehending
and chasing shoplifter was not the proximate cause of customer's injuries.
20. Evidence <s=>506
Expert testimony regarding relative
fault of two tort-feasors was properly excluded as an impermissible legal conclusion.

Richard B. McKeown and Bradley H.
Parker, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Christopher A. Tolboe, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellee.
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a
negligence action. Plaintiff Pearl Steffensen was injured in defendant Smith's
Management Corporation's ("Smith") grocery store by a shoplifter attempting to
flee from the store's management The
jury found Smith was negligent, but the
negligence was not the proximate cause of
Mrs. Steffensen's injury. On appeal, Mrs.
Steffensen asserts the trial court improperly: (1) ruled Smith's failure to train its
employees as to the appropriate methods to
deal with shoplifters or to deter shoplifting
was not, as a matter of law, the proximate
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury; (2)
charged the jury on the law of foreseeability; and (3) excluded certain expert testimony. We affirm.
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FACTS
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered a Smith's grocery store to shoplift
beer and cigarettes. Gary Canham, the
store's front-end manager, observed Mr.
Burnett take beer and cigarettes from the
store's shelves. As Mr. Burnett walked
toward the front of the store, Mr. Canham
suspected Mr. Burnett might attempt to
leave the store without paying for the merchandise. Mr. Canham immediately informed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King
manager, and together the two watched
Mr. Burnett from the office area at the
front of the store. As Mr. Burnett walked
toward the front of the store, he noticed
the two managers and felt they were
watching him. Accordingly, Mr. Burnett
got in line at a checkout stand. As soon as
Mr. Burnett felt he was no longer being
watched, he got out of line and walked
quickly toward the door with the merchandise.
The two managers then confronted Mr.
Burnett and asked him to come with them
to their office. As the three walked toward the office, Mr. Rompus called out to
another employee at the front of the store,
telling her to call the police. As the group
reached the office area, Mr. Burnett turned
and "broke" toward the exit, dropping the
beer and cigarettes as he ran. Mr. Rompus yelled "stop him—see if you can stop
him," in an effort to engage the assistance
of others. Responding to the call for help,
another employee attempted to stop Mr.
Burnett by assuming a football blocking
stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett dodged
this employee, turning in a different direction, and as he did so, ran directly into
another employee. Mr. Burnett "bounced"
off this employee directly into the plaintiff,
Mrs. Steffensen, who was standing at the
customer service counter writing a check.
The force of the collision knocked Mrs.
Steffensen to the ground, where she struck
her head on the tile floor. Mrs. Steffensen
was taken to the hospital and has since
suffered severe "stroke-like" paralysis to
the entire left side of her body.
Subsequently, Mrs. Steffensen commenced this action against Smith, claiming

Smith was negligent in dealing with Mr.
Burnett and that this negligence caused
her injury. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, defense counsel
moved for a partial directed verdict on the
grounds that Smith's failure to deter Mr.
Burnett from shoplifting could not, as a
matter of law, be a proximate cause of
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. The trial judge
granted the motion and incorporated this
ruling in his instructions to the jury. At
the conclusion of trial, the judge submitted
written interrogatories to the jury. After
deliberation, the jury found Smith had acted negligently, but Smith's negligence did
not proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's
injury.
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE
Mrs. Steffensen's first claim of error is
the trial court improperly granted Smith a
partial directed verdict on the element of
proximate causation. During the trial,
Mrs. Steffensen proceeded on two theories
of negligence. First, Mrs. Steffensen asserted Smith had been negligent in failing
to train its employees to use techniques to
"deter" Mr. Burnett from shoplifting and,
alternatively, that Smith's employees negligently failed to utilize these techniques in
dealing with Mr. Burnett. Second, Mrs.
Steffensen claimed Smith was negligent in
chasing and attempting to stop Mr. Burnett
after he broke away and ran. Mrs. Steffensen argued that both of these acts of
negligence endangered the safety of
Smith's customers and ultimately caused
her injuries.
[1] At the close of evidence, Smith
asked the trial judge for a partial directed
verdict, ruling that as a matter of law, even
if its employees had been inadequately
trained about the need for deterrence and
failed to utilize deterrence, such failure
was not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. The trial court granted
Smith's request and instructed the jury
that all Smith's conduct prior to the stop
and detention of Mr. Burnett should not be
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considered by the jury:1
You have heard testimony regarding
events that occurred prior to the time of
the stop of the shoplifter, Mr. Burnett.
You are instructed that none of the actions of the Smith's employees prior to
the stop and detention proximately
caused plaintiffs injuries.
Therefore, you must not take this testimony into consideration when deliberating and making your decision.
[2,3] A directed verdict is only appropriate when the court is able to conclude
that reasonable minds would not differ on
the facts to be determined from the evidence presented. Management Comm. v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 89798 (Utah 1982). A directed verdict cannot
stand when, reviewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the losing party,
"there is a reasonable basis in the evidence
and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in [the
losing party's] favor." Id. at 898; see Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah
1987).

injury; and that there was in fact injury.
Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah
1991). Proximate cause is "that cause
which, in natural and continuous sequence,
(unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause), produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred.
It is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that
accomplish the injury." State v. Lawson,
688 P.2d 479, 482 & n. 2 (Utah 1984). Further, there can be more than one proximate
cause of an injury so long as each is a
concurrent contributing factor in causing
the injury. See Anderson v. Parson RedE-Mix Paving Co., 2A Utah 2d 128, 467
P.2d 45, 46 (1970); Jacques v. Farrimond,
14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963).

[6,7] It is well established that the
question of proximate cause is generally
reserved for the jury. Godesky v. Provo
City Corp., 690 P.2d 541, 544 (Utah 1984);
Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781
P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App.1989), cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Only in
rare cases may a trial judge rule as a
matter of law on the issue of proximate
Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial judge's causation.
jury instruction concerning pre-apprehenThis principle is illustrated by several
sion evidence was improper because reaUtah
Supreme Court decisions. In Harris
sonable minds could differ as to whether a
v.
Utah
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217
failure to "deter" Mr. Burnett from shop(Utah
1983),
the passenger of a jeep
lifting was the proximate cause of her injubrought
an
action
against a bus company
ries.
and the jeep driver for injuries sustained in
[4,5] In Utah, a negligence claim re- a traffic accident The trial court granted
quires the plaintiff to establish four ele- the bus company a directed verdict, inments: that the defendant owed the plain- structing the jury that if they found the
tiff a duty; that defendant breached the jeep driver should have observed the bus
duty (negligence); that the breach of the prior to the accident, they must find, as a
duty was the proximate cause of plaintiffs matter of law, that the jeep driver was the
1. Although the trial judge both granted a directed verdict and incorporated his ruling in the
court's jury instructions, we conclude the ruling
is most accurately characterized as a partial
directed verdict. A directed verdict makes a
determination as to an element of a cause of
action, and takes such determination from the
purview of the jury—as was done here. The
Utah Supreme Court characterized the same action of a trial judge as a directed verdict in
Harris v. Utah Transit Autk, 671 P.2d 217, 219
(Utah 1983). In Harris, a personal injury action
stemming from a jeep-bus collision, the trial
judge instructed the jury that if they found that
the defendant jeep driver should have observed

the bus, then they must conclude, as a matter of
law, the jeep driver was the sole proximate
cause of the collision, thereby precluding liability stemming from the bus driver's actions. Id.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court recognized
that this instruction was in fact a directed verdict and treated it as such. The trial judge's
ruling in this case is indistinguishable from the
ruling in Harris, and therefore we likewise consider the trial court's ruling a directed verdict
and review it accordingly. See also Cerritos
Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608
(Utah 1982) (motion for directed verdict tests
the sufficiency of the evidence).
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sole proximate cause of the accident. On dered hotel guest brought a wrongful
appeal, the plaintiff claimed that a jury death action against the hotel after the
could infer that the bus negligently contrib- deceased had been unexplainedly murdered
uted to the accident and pointed to allega- in his hotel room. Plaintiffs sought to
tions that the bus stopped too rapidly, prove that the hotel management was negfailed to drive out of the lane of traffic, ligent in its security measures and that
and had faulty brake lights. Id, at 220. such negligence proximately caused the
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the murder. On appeal, the Utah Supreme
plaintiff and reversed the directed verdict. Court upheld the trial judge's summary
The Harris court held it improper for the judgment for the defendant. The court
trial judge to have taken the issue of proxi- held that because there was no evidence as
mate cause from the jury. The court ex- to how the murderer entered the deplained: "Where the evidence is in dispute ceased's room, plaintiffs had failed to show
including the inferences from the evidence, a factual connection between the negligent
the issue should be submitted to the jury." security measures and the murder. The
Id.
Mitchell court recognized that the murderLikewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States er could have entered the room in a number
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 of ways, many of which would have had no
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defen- connection with the hotel's security meadant summary judgment on the issue of sures, including by invitation of the deproximate cause in an action where the ceased. Because plaintiffs bore the burden
plaintiff had been injured in an automobile to show defendant's conduct was a "subaccident. The plaintiff claimed he was un- stantial causative factor that led to the
able to see approaching traffic in executing [guest's] death," id. at 246, and because
a left-hand turn because a van owned by plaintiffs had offered no evidence other
the defendant utility company negligently than mere speculation as to how the murblocked his view by remaining in the inter- derer got in the room, summary judgment
section, and this was an intervening proxi- on the issue of proximate causation was
mate cause of the accident. On appeal, the proper.
Utah Supreme Court reversed the sumIn sum, the issue of proximate cause
mary judgment on the issue of proximate
cause. The court held that the issue of should be taken from the jury only where:
proximate cause may only be taken from (1) there is no evidence to establish a causal
the jury where reasonable minds could not connection, thus leaving causation to jury
differ as to what "was or was not the speculation, or (2) where reasonable perproximate cause of the injury." Id. at 365 sons could not differ on the inferences to
n. 4. The court concluded that "in a situa- be derived from the evidence on proximate
tion involving independent intervening causation. Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of
cause, the primary issue is one of the America, Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 789 P.2d
foreseeability of the subsequent negligent 1040, 1047 (1990) (en banc).
conduct of a third person, and in this
Smith argues that its failure to deter Mr.
case, [the issue of proximate cause] must Burnett could not have been the proximate
be resolved by the finder of fact." Id. at cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury because
365 (emphasis added).
there was not an unbroken causal line beIn Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 tween this failure and Mrs. Steffensen's
P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme injury. Specifically, Smith argues the act
Court upheld the trial court's summary of apprehending Mr. Burnett, Mr. Burjudgment for defendant on the issue of nett's decision to run, and Mr. Burnett's
proximate causation because the court physical encounter with Smith's employees,
found no evidence of proximate cause and were, as a matter of law, intervening proxidetermined that, without evidence, the is- mate causes and therefore broke the chain
sue would have been left to juror specula- of causation flowing from its failure to
tion. In Mitchell, dependents of a mur- deter.
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[8-10] Smith correctly asserts that "a
more recent negligent act may break the
chain of causation and relieve the liability
of a prior negligent actor under the proper
circumstances." Godesky, 690 P.2d at 544.
However, if the subsequent negligent act is
foreseeable to the prior actor,-both acts are
concurring causes and the prior actor is not
absolved of liability. Id. The issue is
whether the subsequent intervening conduct, either criminal or negligent, was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 545; Harris,
671 P.2d at 220. "A superseding cause,
sufficient to become the proximate cause of
the final result and relieve defendant of
liability for his original negligence, arises
only when an intervening force was unforeseeable and may be described with the benefit of hindsight, as extraordinary.,, Robertson, 789 P.2d at 1047.2 The fact that
the final act which produces the injury is
the criminal conduct of a third party does
not preclude the finding that an earlier
negligent act was the proximate cause of
injury if the criminal conduct was, under
the circumstances, reasonably foreseeable.
Robertson, 789 P.2d at 1047; Mitchell, 697
P.2d at 246.
[11,12] First, Smith cannot rely on its
own subsequent acts of negligence to
break the chain of causation between an
earlier act of negligence and the injury.
Only the unforeseeable acts of another constitute an intervening proximate cause.
See State v. Marty, 166 Ariz. 233, 801 P.2d
468, 472 (Ct.App.1990); People v. Gentry,
738 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Colo.1987); State v.
Neher, 52 Wash.App. 298, 759 P.2d 475,
476 (1988), affd, 112 Wash.2d 347, 771 P.2d
330 (1989). To hold otherwise would allow
tortfeasors to escape liability by committing additional acts of negligence following
an initial breach of a duty. Therefore,
Smith's apprehension of Mr. Burnett and
the subsequent chase through the store did
not break the chain of causation.
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a
matter of law, that Mr. Burnett's acts fol2. See also George v. LDS Hosp., 797 P.2d 1117
(Utah App.1990) (in wrongful death action, trial
court improperly took proximate cause from
jury on grounds that nurses' failure to notify

lowing apprehension broke the chain of
causation between Smith's failure to deter
Mr. Burnett and Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
Substantial evidence before the jury indicated that Smith could have reasonably
foreseen a customer would be injured by a
shoplifter's decision to run, particularly
when, instead of deterring the shoplifter,
Smith chose to "play cat and mouse" with
him. Certainly Mrs. Steffensen presented
evidence on this theory of causation. A
closer question is whether any reasonable
juror could conclude that the evidence and
all reasonable inferences drawn from it
show Smith's failure to deter was a contributing cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury.
In this case, Mrs. Steffensen introduced
substantial expert testimony that, in dealing with shoplifters, deterrence measures
prevent shoplifting and thus promote customer safety. During trial, Mrs. Steffensen presented testimony from security and
shoplifting experts who testified that
Smith's employees failed to use reasonable
means to handle Mr. Burnett, a suspected
shoplifter, sufficient to protect the safety
of the store's customers. These experts
identified two specific and generally accepted techniques that retail stores employ
when dealing with shoplifters and which
Smith failed to implement. First, the experts testified that a retail store should
take steps to "deter" a suspected shoplifter
from carrying out his or her plan by taking
such affirmative action as making direct
eye contact with the suspected shoplifter,
approaching the suspected shoplifter and
offering assistance, and calling for security
over the public intercom system. Second,
the experts testified that a retail store
should also train its employees to use care
when apprehending a shoplifter. The experts agreed that employees should not
chase or use force with a shoplifter who
becomes violent or flees. These experts
testified that stores employ, or should employ, such techniques primarily to protect
the safety of their customers and to prevent incidents precisely like the one which
doctors of patient's worsening condition was
not proximate cause because of subsequent intervening negligence).
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occurred in this case.3 In addition, Mrs.
Steffensen submitted copies of Smith's employee training manuals which advocated
deterrence when dealing with shoplifters.4
Mr. Burnett was, in fact, deterred when he
thought Smith's employees were watching
while he was in the store. He went to get
in the checkout line and waited there until
he believed he was not being watched.
Further, Mrs. Steffensen's experts testified
that approximately five percent of all shoplifters, when, apprehended, run. They likewise testified that the proper use of deterrence techniques can reduce this number
by reducing the number of shoplifters as a
whole.
[13] Thus, we are hesitant to uphold
the trial court's ruling that, as a matter of
law, Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett
was not a contributing proximate cause of
Mrs. Steffensen's injury. There was probably sufficient evidence produced from
which a reasonable juror could infer that
Smith's failure to deter was a negligent
act,5 as it would have been reasonably fore3. Smith's experts also agreed that these techniques—deterrence and refraining from using
force or chasing the shoplifter—are valid security methods. Their testimony, however, asserted
that Smith's employees had been adequately
trained in these procedures and properly followed the procedures during the Burnett shoplifting incident.
4. Smith's employee manuals contain statements
advocating the use of deterrence techniques in
handling shoplifters:
Make sure that employees on the sales floor
are greeting and making eye contact with
customers, especially those who are acting
suspiciously. Make use of the intercom system by calling for security from time to time.
Very effective tool, it gives the potential shoplifter an uneasy feeling that security is in the
store.
Similarly, the company manuals also instruct its
employees regarding the importance of customer safety in handling shoplifters:
Our company policy is that no employee is to
take any action in the apprehension of a shoplifter which will bring harm to himself, to
other employees, or to customers. The most
important thing to remember about apprehending a shoplifter is that we do not want
anyone injured. There is nothing in the store
that is worth a person getting hurt for. Use
common sense, if the situation can't be properly controlled let the shoplifter go and attempt to get a license number.

seeable to an adequately trained employee
that his or her decision to apprehend the
shoplifter in a crowded store could have led
to a customer's injury.
[14,15] However, this does not end our
inquiry. If the trial court's partial directed
verdict was harmless error, we need not
reverse. See Utah R.Civ.P. 61 (1991);
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah
1989). On appeal, the appellant has the
burden of demonstrating an error was prejudicial—that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings." Verde, 770 P.2d at 120.
Further, in determining whether a trial
court's error was harmful, we must look
beyond the mere fact of error and consider
in totality all the evidence and proceedings
below. See, e.g., Anderson v. Toone, 671
P.2d 170, 175 (Utah 1983) (erroneous jury
instruction not reversible error when considered in light of all instructions and evidence). Although normally we would be
reluctant to uphold an erroneous directed
5. We recognize the trial judge's decision finding
Smith owed Mrs. Steffensen a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect her from the
criminal acts of third parties was correct. Since
trial, the Utah Supreme Court has visited the
issue of a shopowner's duty to protect customers from the criminal acts of third parties. See
Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah
1991). In Dwiggins, the Utah Supreme Court
adopted section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, stating landowners have a duty to
business invitees to take reasonable steps to
protect invitees from the criminal acts of third
parties where such acts are reasonably foreseeable. The Dwiggins court held where a jewelry
store had been robbed only once in ten years, a
robbery is not foreseeable. However, Dwiggins
is distinguishable because the store in question
was the most frequently shoplifted store in the
Smith's chain. Further, the fact that Smith's
employee manuals advocate the safe handling
of shoplifters demonstrates Smith did, in fact,
foresee such criminal acts. Therefore, we believe the trial judge properly found that because
customer injury from shoplifters was foreseeable, the law imposed a duty on Smith to take
reasonable measures to protect its customers
from injuries resulting from dealing with shoplifters. See also Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744
P.2d 43, 46-49 (Colo. 1987) (store owner had a
duty to take reasonable security measures to
protect customers where store had been subject
of armed robbery ten times in past three years)
(relied on by Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 n. 1).
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verdict on harmless error grounds, in this
case we cannot ignore the fact that the
jury's verdict would not have differed had
the trial judge not granted Smith's partial
directed verdict.
At trial, Mrs. Steffensen presented substantial evidence of Smith's negligence: the
store's failure to deter Mr. Burnett's shoplifting, the negligent apprehension and
holding of Mr. Burnett, and the improper
pursuit of Mr. Burnett once he ran for the
door. The trial court's partial directed verdict removed from the jury's consideration
only the portion of this evidence relating to
Smith's actions before Mr. Burnett's apprehension. In returning a verdict for the
defendant on the remaining evidence, the
jury found that although Smith had acted
negligently, the negligence did not proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injuries.
Therefore, the jury must have concluded
that either: (1) the post-apprehension negligence was too attenuated and remote from
the injury to constitute the proximate
cause, or (2) Mr. Burnett's attempt to flee
was an unforeseeable superseding proximate cause of the injury. We cannot see
how the jury would have reached a different conclusion had it been allowed to consider acts Smith performed, or failed to
perform, prior to apprehending Mr. Burnett. Accordingly, we find it highly unlikely the jury would have changed its proximate cause decision had the trial judge
submitted to them the issue of Smith's
failure to deter Mr. Burnett's shoplifting.
Therefore, we find the trial court's partial
directed verdict on the issue of proximate
causation to be, at most, harmless error.

Foreseeability in these instructions
means injury or harm, if any, to a customer which the defendant and its employees could have reasonably anticipated as the natural consequences of their
actions, if any, even though they were
not able to anticipate the particular injury which did occur. In determining what
is foreseeable, you must determine that
the actions by Burnett were predictable
by Smith's employees and not just a
mere possibility.
Mrs. Steffensen claims this instruction improperly focused on the particular acts of
Mr. Burnett, rather than focusing on shoplifters in general. We agree that the specific identity of the shoplifter is irrelevant
to the question of foreseeability. See
Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 (foreseeability
that criminal act will occur establishes
duty). However, it is unnecessary for us
to reach the merits of Mrs. Steffensen's
claim because any error committed by the
trial judge was harmless. See Utah
R.Civ.P. 61 (1991); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120
(Utah 1989). The question of foreseeability
goes to the issue of negligence, and the
jury found Smith negligent. Therefore,
any error in defining foreseeability did not
affect the jury's verdict
III. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY

[18] Mrs. Steffensen's next claim of error is the trial judge improperly excluded
portions of her expert testimony. First,
the trial court forbade one of Mrs. Steffensen's experts from testifying about Smith's
employee training practices as they related
to the way its employees handle shopliftII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ers. Second, the trial court did not allow
[161 Next, Mrs. Steffensen claims the Mrs. Steffensen's expert to give an opinion
trial court incorrectly stated the law with as to the relative proportion of fault beregard to foreseeability when it instructed tween Smith and Mr. Burnett. Challenges
the jury concerning her second theory of to evidentiary rulings, including the exclunegligence—the post-apprehension chase. sion of expert testimony, are reviewed unWe review challenges to jury instructions der a deferential "clear error" standard.
under a "correctness" standard. See See Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225,
Knapstad v. Smith's Management Corp., 1230 (Utah App.1991); State v. Kinsey, 797
774 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App.1989).
P.2d 424, 427 (Utah App.1990). Further,
[17] The trial court's jury instruction an appellant bears the burden of demonnumber thirty-two charged the jury that: strating that the excluded evidence could
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have influenced the jury to render a different verdict. Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d
744, 746 (Utah App.1991).
A. Testimony On Employee Training
Mrs. Steffensen contends the trial court
should have admitted expert testimony concerning Smith's failure to adequately train
lts employees regarding the proper handling of shoplifters, including techniques
for deterring shoplifting. At trial, the
judge did not permit Smith to introduce
this expert testimony on the grounds that
Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett could
not have been the proximate cause of the
injury, and therefore the testimony was
irrelevant.
[19] Our resolution of the proximate
cause issue relating to shoplifter "deterrence" mandates a finding that if this ruling was error, the error was harmless.
Furthermore, the exclusion of any training
evidence relating to Smith's employees
chasing Mr. Burnett was also harmless as
the jury found Smith negligent in its apprehension and chasing of Mr. Burnett.
B. Testimony Apportioning Fault
[20] Mrs. Steffensen's final argument
is that her expert witness should have been
allowed to render an opinion concerning the
relative fault of Smith and Mr. Burnett.
Smith contends the trial court's ruling was
correct because the apportionment of fault
requires the expert to render a legal conclusion and is thus inadmissible under Utah
law. We agree with Smith that the apportionment of fault requires a legal opinion
and, therefore, such a determination should
be reserved for the jury.

"[questions which allow a witness to simply tell a jury what result to reach are not
permitted." Id. at 1231. A witness may
testify as to the defendant's actions, includj n g whether the defendant acted with care;
however, the witness may not consider all
the facts and render a final legal conclusion. We find apportionment of fault between parties to be exactly this type of
impermissible legal conclusion. It is for
the jury to place a legal proportion on the
relative faults of the parties. Therefore,
we hold that the trial court's exclusion of
expert testimony regarding the relative
proportion of fault between Smith and Mr.
Burnett was correct,
CONCLUSION
In summary, even if the trial judge improperly invaded the province of the jury
by granting Smith a partial directed verdict
on the issue of proximate causation, such
error was harmless given the jury's finding
that Smith's subsequent negligent acts
were not the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. Further, any error in defining "foreseeability" for the jury was
rendered harmless by the jury's finding
that Smith was negligent. Finally, the trial
court correctly excluded expert testimony
which would have improperly rendered a
legal conclusion as to the proportion of
fault between Smith and Mr. Burnett. Accordingly, we affirmi the jury verdict for
defendant.
GREENWOOD and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.

This court recently considered the question of what expert opinions are permissible as going to the "ultimate issue," 6 and
what expert opinions are inadmissible as
"legal" conclusions. See Davidson, 813
P.2d at 1230-32. In Davidson, we held the
trial court properly excluded an expert
opinion which concluded that the defendant
was negligent. In doing so, we stated that
6. 'Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be

decided by the trier of fact." Utah R.Evid. 704
(1991).
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I.

PURPOSE OF THE MEETING;
TO INFORM ALL STORE EMPLOYEES ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF SHRINK
A.
AND TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS EVERYONES RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTROL
OR PREVENT SHRINK.
II. DEFINTION OF SHRINK:
A.
SHRINK IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ALL OF THE MERCHANDISE THAT
WE SIGN FOR AT THE BACK DOOR AND THAT WHICH GOES OUT THE FRONT
DOOR AT FULL RETAIL. EVERYTHING THAT IS LOST IN BETWEEN THAT
WE DO NOT SELL AT THE FULL RETAIL PRICE IS SHRINK. IN VERY
SIMPLE TERMS SHRINK IS UNNECESSARY LOSS WHICK REDUCES OR ELIMINATES PROFIT.
B.
IN THE GROCERY BUSINESS OUR PROFIT MARGIN IS 1%. AFTER YOUR
STORE HAS PAID ALL OF ITS OPERATING COSTS THE MOST WE CAN MAKE
IS 1% PROFIT. IN OTHER WORDS FOR EVERY $100.00 WORTH OF
MERCHANDISE WE SELL WE CAN ONLY HOPE TO MAKE ONE DOLLAR. IF
THERE IS A PROBLEM WITH SHRINK IN YOUR STORE IT REDUCES THAT
NARROW 1% PROFIT MARGIN. IN ORDER TO STAY IN BUSINESS AND
BUILD BEAUTIFUL STORES WHICH ALSO PROVIDE ENJOYABLE CLEAN
PLACES TO WORK WE MUST ALL BE INVOLVED IN ELIMINATING SHRINK.
C.
LAST YEAR
THE INTERMOUNTAIN REGION WHICH YOU ARE A PART
OF LOST A TOTAL OF
IN SHRINK. THIS FIGURE IS
FOR THE GROCERY AND DRUGKING DEPARTMENTS AND DOES NOT INCLUDE
PERIMETER DEPARTMENTS SUCH AS THE BAKERY, PHARMACY, PRODUCE,
AND MEAT. WE DISCOVER WHAT OUR SHRINK IS BY TAKING INVENTORIES.
THE GROCERY AND DRUGKING DEPARTMENTS TAKE INVENTORY THREE TIMES
A YEAR WHILE THE PERIMETER OR PERISHABLE DEPARTMENTS INVENTORY
EVERY MONTH.
III. CAUSES OF SHRINK;
A.
SHRINK CAN BE BROKEN INTO FOUR BASIC AREAS FOR CONTROL.
15% OF ALL SHRINK IS CAUSED BY SHOPLIFTING. HOW DO WE
1.
CONTROL THIS?
WE HAVE FOUND THAT IN MOST CASES IT IS NOT EFFECTIVE
a.
TO HIRE A SHOPLIFTING AGENT, HOWEVER WE DO IN SOME
STORES THAT SUFFER EXTREME LOSS. ON THE AVERAGE IT
COSTS APPROXIMATELY $10.00 FOR EVERY $2.00 WORTH OF
MERCHANDISE RECOVERED BY A SHOPLIFTING AGENT, THAT
IS DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY. FOR THE MOST PART WE RELY
ON YOU TO PREVENT SHOPLIFTING.
b.
MAKE SURE THAT EMPLOYEES ON THE SALES FLOOR ARE
GREETING AND MAKING EYE CONTACT WITH CUSTOMERS
ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO ARE ACTING SUSPICIOUSLY.
c.
MAKE USE OF THE INTERCOM SYSTEM BY CALLING FOR SECURITY FROM TIME TO TIME. VERY EFFECTIVE TOOL, IT
GIVES THE POTENTIAL SHOPLIFTER AN UNEASY FEELING
THAT SECURITY IS IN THE STORE.
d.
PROCECUTE ALL SHOPLIFTERS THAT ARE CAUGHT. THERE
WILL BE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS, BECAUSE OF AGE, SUCH AS
JUVENILES UNDER 13 OR THE VERY ELDER. NEVER RELEASE
A JUVENILE WHO HAS BEEN CAUGHT SHOPLIFTING, EXCEPT
m
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2.

3.

TO THEIR PARENTS, POLICE OR RESPONSIBLE ADULT.
e.
WE SHOULD ALWAYS GET A MANAGEMENT LEVEL PERSON
INVOLVED IN MAKING THE ACTUAL ARREST. NEVER TAKE
A CUSTOMERS WORD FOR OBSERVING A SHOPLIFTING UNLESS
THEY ARE WILLING TO STAY AND EXPLAIN TO THE POLICE
WHAT THEY OBSERVED. (DISCUSS ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR
A VALID ARREST).
f.
THE MOST IMPORTANT THING TO REMEMBER ABOUT APPREHENDING A SHOPLIFTER IS THAT WE DO NOT WANT ANYONE INJURED. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE STORE THAT IS WORTH
A PERSON GETTING HURT FOR. USE COMMON SENSE, IF THE
SITUATION CAN'T BE PROPERLY CONTROLLED LET THE
SHOPLIFTER GO AND ATTEMPT TO GET A LICENSE NUMBER.
15% OF ALL SHRINK IS CAUSED BY VENDORS AND SALESMEN WHO
CALL ON OUR STORES. (TOSS THE QUESTION OUT TO THE GROUP,
"HOW CAN THESE PEOLE CAUSE US SHRINK?")
a.
MOST OF THIS LOSS CAN BE CONTROLLED BY FOLLOWING
GOOD RECEIVING PRATICES AT THE BACK DOOR.
b.
DO NOT ALLOW SALESMAN TO REMOVE ANY BOXES THROUGH
FRONT OR BACK DOORS WITHOUT BEING CHECKED. LAUNDRY
BAGS SHOULD NEVER LEAVE THE STORE WITHOUT BEING
CHECKED, WE HAVE FOUND A HAM OR SEVERAL STEAKS INSIDE
OF THESE.
C.
CHECK LARGE BRIEF CASES SALESMAN CARRY IN AND OUT OF
STORE.
d.
NO ONE BUT STORE EMPLOYEES ARE ALLOWED TO USE TRASH
COMPACTORS. MANY SALESMAN HAVE BEEN CAUGHT THROWING
AWAY CREDITABLE MERCHANDISE.
e.
REMEMBER THE MAJORITY OF THE VENDORS AND SALESMAN
ARE GOOD HONEST PEOLE WHO DO A LOT FOR US AND SHOULD
ALWAYS BE TREATED WITH PROFESS IONI LI SM. IT IS THE
TEN PERCENT THAT CAUSE THE PROBLEM.
10% OF ALL SHRINK IS CAUSED FROM DAMAGED AND SPOILED MERCHANDISE.
a.
IS DAMAGE BEING CAUSED BY THE FREIGHT CREW. ARE
CASES BEING THROWN HALF WAY DOWN THE AISLE. DOES
THE STOCKER KNOW HOW TO PROPERLY USE A BOX CUTTER.
BEGIN CLEAN-UP IMMEDIATELY ON DAMAGED CASES, ONE
BROKEN BOTTLE OR JAR IN A CASE IS NO REASON TO LOSE
THE WHOLE CASE.
b.
BROKEN, DAMAGED OR SPOILED MERCHANDISE IS NEVER TO
BE THROWN AWAY WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE GROCERY
MANAGER, DRUGKING MANAGER OR THE RECEIVING CLERK.
WE CAN RECEIVE FULL CREDIT FROM THE VENDOR ON MOST
OF THESE ITEMS,
C.
A CLEAN AND PROPERLY MAINTAINED SPOILS SECTION IS
TO BE SET-UP AND WORKED DAILY.
d.

ANYTIME YOU OBSERVE PERISHABLE ITEMS THAT CUSTOMERS

.««i, uiin Diun±nu UUT Vt' PLACE, PLEASE RETURN THEM
IMMEDIATELY TO THEIR PROPER DEPARTMENT, SUCH AS
FROZEN, MEAT, PRODUCE. IT DOES NOT MATTER IF YOU
WORK IN THAT DEPARTMENT OR NOT, PROFITABILITY OF
THE STORE IS A TEAM EFFORT.
60% OF ALL SHRINK IS CAUSED BY EMPLOYEE THEFT OR ERROR.
WE PREFER TO BELIEVE THAT THE BIGGEST PART OF THE 60%
IS CAUSED BY ERROR, HOWEVER EMPLOYEE THEFT IS A REALITY
BASED ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WE LOSE EACH YEAR DUE TO
AN ACT OF DISHONESTY. FIRST WE WILL DISCUSS SOME OF THE
ERRORS THAT CAUSES SHRINK. ONE OF THE MOST CRITICAL
AREAS IN THE STORE WHERE ERROR MUST BE ELIMINATED IS ON
THE FRONT END AT THE CHECKSTAND.
a.
PRODUCE CHARTS ON ALL CHECKSTANDS.
b.
CHECKER AIDS AND UNMARKED ITEMS LISTED UP ON ALL
CHECKSTANDS WITH CURRENT PRICES.
C.
ARE PROPER PRICE CHECK PROCEDURES BEING FOLLOWED OR
IS THE GUESSING GAME BEING PLAYED.
1.
WHEN AND HOW ARE PRICING ERRORS BEING CORRECTED.
2.
KEY CARRIERS NEED TO BE NOTIFIED ON ALL SCAN
ERRORS SO ITEM CAN BE CORRECTED IMMEDIATELY.
ALSO ALL ITEMS GIVEN AWAY DUE TO SCAN ERRORS
MUST BE KEPT TRACK OF.
d.
ARE CHECKERS SPLIT UP TO COVER BOTH ENDS UP FRONT.
1.
ARE UNUSED CHECKSTANDS CHAINED OFF WHERE FIRE
DEPARTMENT ALLOWS. CARTS AND CHAINS IN THE
EVENING HOURS.
2.
CHECKERS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO LEAVE THEIR REGISTER
IN THE MIDDLE OF AN ORDER, AS A RESULT, CHANCE
OF ANY ITEMS BEING PUSHED THROUGH WILL BE MINIMIZED.
e.
ARE GO BACKS BEING HANDLED PROPERTY. ARE GO BACKS
GOING BACK TO THE SHELF OR ARE THEY PUSHED INTO A
BACKROOM.
f.
HOW DO CHECKERS HANDLE MERCHANDISE ON THE BOOTOM OF
THE CART. WHERE POSSIBLE IT SHOULD ALL COME UP ON
THE CHECKSTAND, BUT IN ALL CASES IT MUST BE LIFTED
UP TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT NOTHING IS CONCEALED UNDERNEATH IT.
g.
ARE VOIDS AND OVERRINGS BEING PROPERLY HANDLED.
APPROVAL BEING OBTAINED WHERE REQUIRED.
1.
NO CUSTOMER SIGNATURE WILL BE REQUIRED ON VOIDS,
OVERRINGS, AND BOTTLE REFUNDS UNDER FIVE DOLLARS
($5.00).
CUSTOMER SIGNATURE AND PHONE NUMBER WILL BE
2.
REQUIRED ON ALL GREEN SLIPS INVOLVING CASH BACK
TO THE CUSTOMER AND GREEN SLIPS OVER FIVE DOLLARS ($5.00).
3.
KEY CARRIERS APPROVAL REQUIRES ON ALL GREEN SLIPS
OF $2.00 OR MORE.
h.
MAKE SURE THAT ALL REGISTERS HAVE DETAIL TAPE AND CUS-

TOMER RECEIPT TAPE. SHOULD BE CHECKED AT THE BEGINNING AND AT THE END OF EVERY SHIFT.
i.
CHECK ALL CASHIERS TO SEE THAT EACH ARTICLE IS
TOUCHED AND RANG. AND NOT RANG AS GROUP WITHOUT
CHECKING PRICE OF EACH ITEM.
j.
CHECK TO MAKE SURE THAT CASHIERS AND BAGGERS ARE
PLACING CASH REGISTER TAPES INTO EVERY ORDER.
k.
MAKE SURE ALL CASHIERS CHECK THEIR SCALES DAILY AND
THAT THEY KNOW HOW TO USE THEM. RE-WEIGH ALL ITEMS
WITH LOOSE LABELS FROM PRODUCE & MEAT DEPT. DISCOURAGES ANY LABEL SWITCHING.
1.
CHECK THAT STORE POLICY ON EMPLOYEE PURCHASES ARE
STRICTLY ADHERED TO. ARTICLES PURCHASED MUST BE
TAKEN FROM THE STORE IMMEDIATELY. AT NO TIME WILL
A CHECKER EVER CHECK OUT THEIR OWN GROCERIES OR A
MEMEBER OF THEIR IMMEDIATE FAMILY.
m.
MAKE SURE THAT UNWANTED AND RETURNED PERISHABLE
MERCHANDISE IS RETURNED TO THE DEPARTMENTS IMMEDIATELY.
n.
CHECK BOTTLE CARTS TO SEE THAT BOTTLES ARE REMOVED
REGULARLY FROM THE FRONT OF THE STORE TO THE BOTTLE
STORAGE AREAS. DO NOT LET BOTTLES STAND AROUND IN
SHOPPING CARTS IN THE FRONT OF THE STORE. POSITION
BOTTLE CARTS AWAY FROM WHERE CUSTOMERS PICK UP THEIR
EMPTY CARTS. WE DO NOT WANT TO BUY BACK BOTTLES MORE
THAN ONCE.
o.
SERVICE LEVEL IS EVERYONE'S PROBLEM AND A MUST FOR
CONTINUED CUSTOMER LOYALTY. ARE YOUR CUSTOMERS LEAVING THE CHECKSTAND WITH A SMILE AND A THANK YOU FROM
OUR CHECKERS?
EMPLOYEE THEFTi (BE POSITIVE AND TACTFUL IN DEALING WITH
THIS SUBJECT, BUT BE SERIOUS). EVERY YEAR THERE ARE MANY
EMPLOYEES WHO ARE TERMINATED AND SEVERAL WHO ARE PUT IN
JAIL FOR THEFT OR DISHONESTY. A LOT OF TIME AND MONEY
HAS GONE INTO TRAINING OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU. AS
AN EMPLOYEE YOU ARE AN ASSET TO SMITH'S AND WE DO NOT WANT
TO LOSE YOU ESPECIALLY FOR SOMETHING AS DUMB AS THEFT. THE
SECURITY DEPARTMENT IN THIS COMPANY DOES NOT TAKE PRIDE IN
TERMINATING EMPLOYEES, WE WANT TO PROTECT OUR ASSETS NOT
LOSE THEM.
a.
ANY ACT AMOUNTING TO THEFT REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT
WILL RESULT IN TERMINATION AND POSSIBLY PROSECUTION.
WE MAINTAIN A VERY HARDLINE STAND ON THIS, THERE ARE
HQ SECOND CHANCES. REMEMBER THE 1% PROFIT MARGIN, IF
AN EMPLOYEE TAKES A 250 ITEM WITHOUT PAYING FOR IT WE
HAVE LOST THE PROFIT ON $25.00 WORTH OF SALES.
b.
THE MOST IMPORTANT RULE TO REMEMBER IS "NO ITEM IS TO
BE CONSUMED. USED. OR TAKEN FROM THE STORE BEFORE IT
IS PAID FOR." THIS POLICY IS BLACK & WHITE, NO EXCUSES SUCH AS I WAS GOING TO PAY FOR IT LATER, WILL
EVER BE ACCEPTED.
C.
PAYING FOR PRODUCT WHEN GOING ON BREAK. UNDER NORMAL
CONDITIONS YOUR BREAK TIME WILL NOT BE REDUCED BY THE

d.
e.
f.

g.

h.

nrwuMi- ur TJ.JUS IT TAKES TO PAY FOR YOUR PURCHASES,
USE COMMON SENSE, DO NOT SPEND TEN MINUTES SHOPPING.
ALWAYS HAVE A SALES RECEIPT FOR ANY MERCHANDISE IN
YOUR POSSESSION.
THERE ARE NO EMPLOYEE DISCOUNTS. THE STORE MANAGER
IS THE ONLY PERSON AUTHORIZED TO APPROVE ANY DISCOUNTS.
EMPLOYEE PURCHASES MUST BE CONSUMED OR REMOVED FROM
THE STORE IMMEDIATELY. EXAMPLE: IF AN EMPLOYEE DOES
THEIR SHOPPING ON THEIR LUNCH HOUR THEY CANNOT HOLD
THEIR GROCERIES IN THE BACKROOM OR DELI-COOLER UNTIL
QUITTING TIME.
DO NOT TOLERATE THEFT IN YOUR STORE. IF YOU OBSERVE
THAT A FRIEND IS EATING OR DRINKING WITHOUT PAYING,
TRY TO GET IT STOPPED BY SAYING SOMETHING TO THEM.
PEER PRESURE CAN BE A POSITIVE THING AS WELL AS
NEGATIVE. IF THIS DOESN'T WORK THEN REPORT IT.
SHOULD YOU OBSERVE SOMETHING IN YOUR STORE THAT YOU
DO NOT FEEL IS RIGHT, YOU ARE INVITED TO REPORT IT
ANONYMOUSLY. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO IDENTIFY YOURSELF
AND WILL NEVER BE FORCED TO DO SO UNLESS YOU WANT TO.
THE SECURITY DEPARTMENT IS A SERVICE ORGANIZATION
WITHIN THE COMPANY. IF THERE IS ANY WAY WE CAN HELP
WITH ANY TYPE OF PROBLEM OR JUST ANSWER A QUESTION
PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO CALL. (MAKE AVAILABLE A
STACK OF YOUR BUSINESS CARDS)

MISC;
A.
SUPPLY POLICY.
B.
POLICY ON SALE OF BEER TO MINORS.
C.
ARMED ROBBERY.
1.
DISCUSS BRIEFLY THE IMPORTANCE OF "COOPERATE AND STAY
ALIVE."

THANK EVERYONE FOR THEIR ATTENDANCE AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE MEETING.
NOTE:

BEFORE THE MEETING PUT TOGETHER A BASKET FULL OF GOOD EXAMPLES TO DEMONSTRATE THE TOPICS YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT.

ADDENDUM D

SHOPLIFTING

IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STORE EMPLOYEES TO TZ\ T"
PROTECT MERCHANDISE FROM THEFT.

HOWEVER, OUR COMPANY POLICY IS THAT NO EMPLOYEE IS TO TAKE
ANY ACTION IN THE APPREHENSION OF A SHOPLIFTER WHICH WILL
BRING HARM TO HIMSELF, TO OTHER EMPLOYEES OR TO CUSTOMERS.
ALL EMPLOYEES ARE URGED TO EXERCISE COMMON SENSE IN THIS
AREA AND TO ALWAYS INVOLVE A MEMBER OF THE STORES MANAGEMENT
TEAM BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO APPREHEND ANY SHOPLIFTER.

4.

S.

YOU MUST SEE THE PERSON* ACTUALLY TAKE THE MERCHANDISE FROM
THE SHELF OR DISPLAY AND KNOW WITHOUT ANY DOUBT THEY ARE
LEAVING THE STORE WITHOUT PAYING FOR IT.
THE BEST RULE TO FOLLOW IS TO BE SURE BEFORE YOU TAKE ANY
ACTION.

IF YOU HAVE ANY DOUBT IN YOUR MIND ABOUT WHETHER A

PERSON HAS ACTUALLY STOLEN SOMETHING, IT IS FAR BETTER TO
TAKE NO ACTION THAT TO WRONGLY ACCUSE A CUSTOMER OF THEFT.
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INTRODUCTION
When a person removes merchandise from your store without paying
for it, you are entitled to recover those items.
It is rr.ost important to remember, however, that a person is not
necessarily guilty of shoplifting just because he die net pay
for certain itemsFor a person to be found guilty of the crime of shoplifting it^
is necessary to be able to prove that the person, in fact,
intended to steal.
It is not a crime to forget to pay for something. The proof
required to make the act of taking a crime, is the formal prcof,
obtained and presented according to strict rules of evidence,
which will satisfy all of the procedural and constitutional
requirements imposed by the courts.
The person who apprehends a shoplifter must have a basic knowledge of those requirements. He must have them in mind each
time he contemplates taking a shoplifter into his custody.
In the past eight years Commercial Service Systems has made a
detailed study of some 85,000 shoplifting cases.
Under 30% of those shoplifters were turned over to the police*
A pertinent question is "Has it possible to handle the 70%
which were released with any less care and caution than was
required in handling the 30% which were prosecuted?"
The answer, from the standpoint of policy, must be that all
shoplifters, prosecutions and non-prosecutions, adults and
juveniles must be handled with equal care and caution.
The obvious reason is that the person who makes the apprehension often changes his mind about the course of action he
is to take after he has apprehended and interrogated the subject.
The apprehending official finds himself in a difficult if not
untenable position if he has ignored the basic rules outlined
in this policy guide.
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DECISION TO ARREST
Only the manager should have the responsibility for apprehending
a shoplifter, but he may delegate the responsibility to those
employees considered by him to be competent to handle such
matters,
1.

Security recommends the manager should delegate this
authority to all key carriers and department heais
but only after he is satisfied that they are qualified
to carry out the responsibility. Other employees can
also be assigned this responsibility, again if the
manager is satisfied that the employee is qualified
to carry out the responsibility. Each nanacer is to
keep this rr.ar.ual on file and all persons authorize
to apprehend shoplifters must read and sign this
manual. The date that said person was appointed
must also be recorded in this manual. Remember, this
manual must be updated whenever key carriers or department heads are transferred.
CITIZEN'S ARREST

A citizen who sees a misdemeanor committed in his presence may
arrest the individual who committed the offense.
It is important to note that this arrest is legal only if it is
made by the citizen who sees the offense committed«
If an employee other than the manager sees the offense committed
he must make the arrest* The manager must have delegated the
authority to arrest to that employee or he must have confidence
in the employee's ability to judge that a crime has been conmitted
and then accompany thte employee who will make the arrest.
RESPONSIBILITY OF SECURITY DIRECTORS KHEN OUTSIDE AGENTS OR
AGENCIES ARE HIRED TO WORK SHOPLIFTING IN OUR STORES
Each
each
sign
that

director will maintain a manual on file showing the date
agent or agencies were employed making agent or agencies
that they have read and understand the manual and also
they have been given a copy of this manual.
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LEGAL STEPS TO APPREHENSION
You must see the shoplifter take your property. You may
then testify that it was, in fact, your merchandise.
You must see the shoplifter conceal the merchandise on his
person.
Concealment: contributes greatly toward establishing that
the shoplifter intended to steal the merchandise and did
not merely forget to pay for it.
You must watch the shoplifter continuously and see that
the merchandise is not "ditched."
If you are diverted so that there is a break in your
surveillance of the shoplifter, you are taking a poorly
calculated risk to later apprehend that person.
You must be able to testify personally, of your own
knowledge, that the merchandise was not paid for.
It is not sufficient to ask the person operating the cash
register if the merchandise was paid for.
If you did not see the shoplifter fail to pay for the
merchandise in question, then you do not have personal
knowledge that a crime has been committed and you do not
have the authority to make a citizen's arrest.
Apprehend the shoplifter outside the store . . • either
on public property, the parking lot: or the sidewalk,
(California only) .
It f s past the checkstands in all
other states.
By permitting the shoplifter to exit the store prior to
making the arrest you have allowed the person to go that
much further in establishing his true intent to steal.
Apprehend the shoplifter in all states, except California,
after he passes the check out counters. /jThe safest place
to arrest is between the checkstands and exit doors. You ^
are on your own grounds.and will be able to get additional]
help if needed.
/
Where a camera bar is located at the front of a store, be
certain that they have passed by any opportunity of paying
for the merchandise there, and are headed to the door.

THE SHOPLIFTER IN YOUR CUSTODY
When apprehending the shoplifter, be sure, be firm and be
positive.
Identify yourself by name and as a store employee.
Always take one or rr.ore enployees with you when you rake the
apprehension.
There is safety in numbers and at least one other person car.
act as corroborating witness.
Address the shoplifter politely and directly.
the following are effective:

Words such as

"Ma*m, I am the store manager. You have a can of our hair
spray in your purse which you did not pay for. Please come
back into the store with me so that we can straighten this
out.M
Reasonable force can be employed if the shoplifter refuses
to return, but your safety and the safety of those you are
responsible for must always be foremost in your mind.
Have the employee who is backing you up follow to see that
the shoplifter does not discard the stolen merchandise.
Attempt to recover at least one item when you first stop the
shoplifter.
Your most important asset will be an attitude which conveys
confidence and self assurance. If you show doubt or in- •
decision the shoplifter will sense your uncertainty and
exploit it to your disadvantage.
If the shoplifter escapes before you recover your merchandise,
telephone the police.
Give description and the description and license number of
the automobile if you were able to obtain it.
Inform the police, and-make sure they understand, that you
are making an advisory report only and that you DO NOT
want the person apprehended.
When the police pick up such a suspect they must do so on
their own and for their own investigation. At that point
the suspect has always discarded the evidence and it is
difficult if not impossible to convict a shoplifter unless
you can produce the merchandise you recovered from him.
-6-

QUESTIONING THE SHOPLIFTER
1.

Your purpose in interrogating the shoplifter is three-fold:
A. To recover all of your merchandise.
B. To obtain a confession fron the shoplifter.
C. To obtain the shoplifter's signature on the forr which
releases the store and all parties involved in the
apprehension from Civil Liability.

2.

Utilize a private roor?. off the sales floor.

3. Always have a witness present.
have a female witness present.

If the shoplifter is a fe.T.ale

4.

Being able to name the item and the place of concealment
will go a long way toward convincing the shoplifter that he
has been caught redhanded.

5.

Instruct the shoplifter to place all of the items they have
not paid for on the table or desk.

6.

A positive attitude and persistence on your part will
usually produce results.
If the shoplifter refuses to produce the stolen merchandise
you may decide to call for uniformed police assistance.
Be very alert that the shoplifter does not ditch the
merchandise while you are waiting for assistance to arrive.

7.

Most shoplifting subjects appear to cooperate because they
are interested in getting their predicament resolved with
as little trouble as possible.

8.

Most shoplifters will claim that it is the first time they
have stolen merchandise. Admissions of prior thefts are not
greatly important as one should not accept restitution for
prior thefts and if prosecuted the shoplifter will be convicted of the current offense only.

9.

The only way restitution for prior thefts should be accepted
is at a later time at the company's main office with proper
representation on both sides to foreclose entirely the
possibility of any claim of extortion.

10.

A standard civil release form which also contains all of
the information pertinent to the circumstances of the theft
should be used routinely and should be kept on hand in all
stores.
_7_

COMPLETING THE CIVIL RELEASE FORM
(Also known as SMC Shoplifing Apprehension Form)
Ask the shoplifter for identificationFill out ell blanks and answer all questions en the release
form. It is impossible to try to remember details at some
later time. Make release in duplicate, one to the store
files and or.e mailed to iecunty.
After you have completed the release form ask the shoplifter
to read it aloud.
When you are satisfied that the shoplifter understands the
release form ask hin to sign.
Language such as the following will be helpful in obtaining
the signature:
"If I have the information all correct I would like for you
to indicate so by putting your signature on this line. You
may use i?.y pen" . . . At that point hand the shoplifter your
Pen.
If the shoplifter indicates that they are reluctant to sign
because they do not want to adr.it in writing that they stole
something, explain that the stateinent is not .an admission of
theft but rather an agreement that they did leave the store
without paying and that it was reasonable for you to recover
your merchandise.
If you have already made the decision to prosecute the
shoplifter, obtaining the signature on the form is less
important.
A criminal conviction is perhaps the best kind of protection
against civil liability in a shoplifting case.
If you intend to release the shoplifter, the civil release
is of great importance.
If the shoplifter refuses to sign the release the person
should be prosecuted unless there are circumstances which
make it obvious to you that it would be difficult to obtain
a conviction.
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6.
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7.
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8.

Under Clothing

9.

Other
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SITUATIONS WHERE IT APPEARS PRUDENT TO PROSECUTE
ADULT SHOPLIFTERS
1.

The shoplifter refuses to sign the civil release form.

2.

The shoplifter has no identification.

3.

The shoplifter resists or attacks store personnel.

4.

The shoplifter appears to be under the influence of drugs.,

5.

The shoplifter appears to be intoxicated. (In this case the
police rr.ay bock the person on a drunk charge rather than a
shoplifting charge.)

6.

The shoplifter has a prior record,

7.

The theft involves a large anount of merchandise.

8.

The person appears to be a professional shoplifter.
A. He employs .a booster box or other device.
B. It appears that he has other stolen merchandise in his
vehicle.

9.

The theft involves cartons of cigarettes.

10.

The theft involves liquor-

11.

The theft involves fresh meat in a quantity-which causes you
to suspect that the stolen merchandise is to be sold.

12.

Any other unusual circumstances which cause you to believe
that it would be wise to call the police into the case.
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SITUATIONS WHERE IT APPEARS PRUDENT TO RELEASE ADULT
SHOPLIFTERS INSTEAD OF INITIATING PROSECUTION
The manager rr.ay elect to release the shoplifter instead of
having hin becked ar.y time the civil release form has beer.
signed or when extenuating circumstances suggest release
rather than prosecution.
Following are situations where judgement may indicate release:<
1.

You are convinced as a result of your observations and as
a result of ycur interrogation that the subject honestly
forgot to pay and cid not: intend to steal the merchandise.

2.

The subject is senile and would probably receive great
sympathy from a jury or a judge.

3.

The subject is pregnant and would receive sympathy.

4.

The subject appears to be contrite or at least gives you
complete cooperation following the apprehension.

5.

You have recently booked so many shoplifters that you are
concerned about the amount of time you may have to spend
in court.

OUR YEARLY SURVEYS SHOW THAT SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 70% OF ALL
SHOPLIFTERS APPREHENDED ARE RELEASED WITHOUT THE POLICE BEING
BROUGHT INTO THE CASE.

-11-

PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING JUVENILE SHOPLIFTERS
(Those under 18 years of age)
In some stores, juveniles make up at least half of the shopliftmq
problem. Therefore, it is obvious that the juvenile*s contribution to shoplifting losses must be treated seriously. A
standard policy rv.ust be followed in handling all juvenile offender.
1.

The portion of the release form which contains icenifyinq
information must be completely filled out in each case.
The temptation with juveniles and particularly youncer ones
is simply to recover the merchandise and eject them fron the
store.

2.

The juvenile should be released only to his parents or to
your local police agency.
In California the usual procedure is for juvenile officers
to interview the subject and check their card file for
prior problems.
If there are no prior problems the juvenile people release
the subject to his parents.

3.

This procedure accomplishes the following:
A. It makes a far greater impression on the juvenile and
his family when the offense is handled in an official
manner.
B. You establish within the juvenile community the fact that
shoplifting is not tolerated in your stores.
C. You foreclose that rare possibility that something will
happen to the juvenile between the time you release him
and the time he reaches home, for which you may be blamed.
D. You foreclose the possibility of the juvenile concocting
an untrue story in his own defense concerning your mistreatment of him.

4.

Some companies have the juvenile sign the release form. The
thought is 'that the more official the procedure seems the
more impressed the juvenile will be.

5.

Most companies call parents directly in-many juvenile cases.
This is perfectly acceptable anytime your judgement dictates
that course of action.
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SIGNING OF COMPLAINTS
When you have a shoplifter booked, the police present the facts
to the appropriate prosecutor. The prosecutor then issues a
criminal complaint against the shoplifter.
This co.T.rl::r.t rust be signed by the person who mace the citizen 's arrest.
It is good policy to ask the transporting officers where and
when the complaint is to be signed. If they do not know, ask *
them for the telephone number of their watch commander so that
you can call him and inquire.
The signing of the complaint is crucial. It must be the responsibility of the person who made the citizen's arrest. If the
complaint is not signed the case cannot proceed and there will
be no prosecution of the shoplifter.
Do not rely on someone calling you with a request to appear and
sign the complaint. Take the initiative yourself to determine
what is necessary.
If an oversight occurs and the complaint is not signed the shoplifter will probably go free and may very well bring a civil suit
against you and your company.
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Identii} "h* . . enrs on the outside of the package with
the name c,i L.*C shoplifter, date, name of the person who
made the apprehension, names of witnesses and any other
pertinent data,
n d c e package in a safe place unti i it, is determined
if the shoplifter pleads guilty or if a trial i s .scheduled
at which time the evidence will be required,
JJ. Iii case the d*^Dition of a shoplifter's case has vox
been received within thirty days, the store manager
should call the police and inquire
Information may
be available which wjll permit the return of the
evidence to stock.
WHEN THE EVIDENCE IS RETAINED IN THE STORE AND YOU ARE SUMMONED
TO TESTIFY AT A SHOPLIFTER'S "TRIAL, ALWAYS TAKE AI .L EVIDENCE
TO COURT WITH YOU.

"I 4

POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED WHEN APPEARING IN COURT AS A WITNESS
Make notes of the circumstances when a shoplifter is apprehended.
These notes should be made on the back of your civil release
form. That way you will have them on court day.
Review your notes prior to taking the witness stand and offer
your notes to the prosecutor.
Make the best impression by being neat and by dressir.c conservatively when appearing in court.
Do not chew gum on the witness stand or any tine court is in
session.
Do not talk or visit with others while court is in session.
While on the witness stand speak clearly and loudly enough
so that you will not be required to repeat your answers.
Remember you can testify only to what you saw personally.
(No hearsay).
Remember you cannot repeat any conversation which took place
out of the hearing of the defendant*
Remember you must adhere to the facts. Your conclusions or
assumptions are net allowed as testimony.
Answer all questions directly and in as simple terms as
possible.
A. The natural tendency is to be overly expansive when you
think a question does not engender an adequate answer.
B. Rely on the prosecutor to ask additional questions which
will clear up any misunderstanding.
Do not make voluntary statements while on the witness stand.
A. Suggest to the prosecutor any testimony you have in mind
before you take the stand.
B. Rely on the prosecutor1 s judgement about what should be
brought out as testimony.
If you do not know the answer to a question, say so in a
direct way.
If you do not hear a question, politely ask that it be repeated.
If you do not understand a question, say so in a direct manner.
Do not fall into the trap of trying to match wits with defense
counsel.
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RESPONSIBILITY OF STORE EMPLOYEES
It is the responsibility of store employees to try to protect
merchandise from theft.
However, company policy is that no employee is to take er.y
action in the apprehension of a shoplifter which will bring
harm to himself, to other employees or to customers.
Each person is expected to do what he can to prevent shoplifting
and to apprehend shoplifters when his action is consistent with
instructions based on company policy.
All employees are urged to exercise ordinary common sense m
this area and to consult with a superior when there is any
doubt about the course of action to follow.
The best rule to follow is to be sure before you take any acti:r..
If you have any doubt in your mind about whether a person has
actually stolen something, it is far better to take no action
until you are sure.
Make a mental note of the person. If they stole from you
successfully on one occasion they will probably bring you more
of their "business" and you will have the opportunity to see
and do all that is required before you take action.

SUGGESTED POLICY FOR ESTABISHING AND MAINTAINING A
GOOD WORKING RELATIOSHIF" WITH YOUfl LOCAL POLiu,
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FOLLOWING ARE BASIC POINTS WHICH YOUR LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY WILL BE INTERESTED IN
1.

That you have policy and procedures for handling shoplifters.

2.

That such policy emanates from your company's upper r.ar.acement and that it is observed by all concerned.

3.

That your security force and responsible store employees
understand the basics of citizen's .arrest.

4.

That you are not going to use the police to try to scare
shoplifters; that when you call uniformed officers to the
store it is because you desire to have a shoplifter transported and booked.

5.

That once the shoplifter has been booked, you are prepared
to follow through with the prosecution. This includes your
signing the criminal complaint at the appropriate time and
your producing the witnesses required by the prosecution.

6.

That you understand when uniformed officers respond to ycur
call they do so for the purpose of transporting and booking
the suspect and not for the purpose of making the arrest.

1.

That you understand that all calls for assistance are
assigned a priority. A call concerning an armed robbery
in progress will take precedence over a call concerning a
shoplifter in custody at your store* That there may be
delays in answering your call for this reason.

REMEMBER THAT YOUR POLICE OFFICIALS HILL PROBABLY UNDERSTAND AND
RESPOND TO YOUR NEEDS BASED UPON YOUR APPROACH TO THEM AND IN
RELATIONSHIP TO YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS.
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